Index No. 705705/23.
Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County.
Decided March 27, 2025.
Andrew L. Saraga, Esq., counsel for Plaintiff Titan Pharmacy.
Brittany DePrimo, Esq., counsel for Defendant GEICO.
PATRICK HAYES TORRES, J.
This motion and cross-motion are determined as follows:
In this No-Fault action, Plaintiff’s assignor was involved in a motor vehicle accident in New Jersey on August 11, 2019. Plaintiff’s assignor, a New Jersey resident, obtained a policy from Defendant. Defendant’s automobile policy contained an amendment stating any disputed claim can only be resolved through dispute resolution pursuant to New Jersey law.
Plaintiff moved for a Stay of Arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503(b) on the grounds that Defendant’s participation in this litigation waived its right to compel arbitration. Defendant cross-moved requesting a Stay of the prosecution of this matter and compelling Plaintiff to file the instant action in the New Jersey Arbitration Forum. Defendant alleged that a request to arbitrate was submitted and their participation in litigation was based on defensive purposes.
In general, New York favors and encourages arbitration as a means of conserving the time and resources of the courts and the contracting parties (Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v. Investors Ins. Co. of America, 37 NY2d 91, 95 [1975]; McSpedon v. Profile Electric, Inc., 137 AD2d 669, 670 [2d Dept 1988]). Therefore, New York courts interfere as little as possible with the freedom of consenting parties to submit disputes to arbitration (Mr v. AR, 48 Misc 3d 1201(a) [Sup Ct Kings County 2015]).
In this matter, Defendant’s automobile policy issued to Plaintiff’s assignor contained an amendment that any claim in dispute with the Personal Injury Protection can only be resolved through dispute resolution pursuant to New Jersey law. Plaintiff claimed that the first time Defendant objected to Plaintiff proceeding in court was by a letter dated August 19, 2024. Contrary to Plaintiff’s contention, Defendant’s demand to arbitrate was rather immediate.
Plaintiff failed to note that Defendant, upon serving their Answer to Plaintiff’s complaint on April 20, 2023, attached a letter invoking the right to arbitrate the claim along with a Stipulation of Discontinuance for Plaintiff to execute, which was apparently ignored. Moreover, Defendant’s Answer dated April 20, 2023, invoked the right to arbitrate as an Affirmative Defense in paragraphs 18, 24, and 25. Thus, from the onset of this litigation, Defendant had been invoking their right to arbitrate.
Moreover, Defendant did not waive the right to arbitrate by merely serving discovery demands with their Answer. Defendant’s discovery demands were limited and minimal, which Plaintiff either ignored or failed to comply with. See Stark v. Molod Spitz DeSantis & Stark, P.C., 9 NY3d 59, 67 [2007]; SSM Realty LLC v. 20 Sherman Assocs., LLC, 101 AD3d 433 [1st Dept 2012]; Braun Equip. Co. v. Borelli Assoc., 220 AD2d 311 [1st Dept 1995]; Two Cent. Tower Food v. Pelligrino, 212 AD2d 441, 442 [1st Dept 1995]. Thus, the foregoing limited discovery cannot be said to manifest Defendant’s intent to litigate this matter in court instead of arbitration.
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied in that Defendant’s limited discovery demands did not manifest its intent to litigate this matter in court. Defendant, from the commencement of this action, had on more than one occasion requested Plaintiff to arbitrate. Defendant’s notice of cross-motion is granted to the extent that this litigation is stayed, and Plaintiff is to engage in arbitration as demanded by Defendant. Any relief not expressly addressed herein has nonetheless been considered and is denied.
The foregoing constitutes the Order and Decision of the Court.